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 Introduction
Thinkers once spoke of ‘structures’, ‘systems’, ‘meaning’, ‘life world’,
‘events’ and ‘actions’ when naming the primary generic social thing.
Today, many theorists would accord ‘practices’ a comparable honour.
Theodore Schatzki, “Practice Theory”
So begins the introduction to a much-cited volume advocating a “practice turn” in 
contemporary social theory (Schatzki, Knorr Cetina and von Savigny 2001: 1). I 
think these anonymous theorists are on the right track. Human practices are a fun-
damental constituent – arguably “the” fundamental constituent – of social reality. 
This book attempts to develop the implications of this observation for the social 
sciences. It therefore seeks to demonstrate the considerable potential fertility – 
both theoretical and empirical – of a research programme centred on historical 
practices. It suggests that the empirical social sciences and humanities would reap 
considerable rewards from paying more systematic attention to practices as an 
object of analysis.
In some quarters, a claim like this is likely to meet something of a paradoxical 
response: some are liable to see it as rather obscure, others as utterly trite. This 
book seeks to show that it is neither. For the puzzled reader, it proposes an origi-
nal, systematic framework for how we might conceptualise, theorise, identify and 
study human practices. For the jaded reader – the one who wonders what social 
scientists have been studying for the past century if not human behaviour, and 
considers “practice-talk” a hazy and contrived redescription of something well-
studied and entirely familiar – it offers a detailed discussion of the distinctiveness 
and relative merits of the practice approach as conceived in these pages. To both 
readers, and to others besides, it offers analysis and illustration of the approach’s 
conceptual, epistemological and methodological implications, and of the specific 
benefits social scientists and historians might expect to gain from adopting it.
This book thus represents one effort to provide a methodical response to some 
of the elementary questions raised by David Stern in his survey of the “practical 
turn” in social theory and the social sciences:
2 Introduction
What is “practice theory”? The best short answer is that it is any theory that 
treats practice as a fundamental category, or takes practices as its point of 
departure. Naturally, this answer leads to further questions. What is meant by 
“practices” here? What is involved in taking practices as a point of departure 
or a fundamental category, and what does that commitment amount to? And 
what is the point of the contrast between a practice-based theory and one that 
starts elsewhere?
(Stern 2003: 185)
These are important questions, and they deserve a clear and reflected response. In 
answering them, this book aims to promote and contribute to “practice theory” – 
to the lively and burgeoning literature of the past two decades applying an ana-
lytical emphasis on practices to the empirical and theoretical study of the social 
sciences.1 But its ambitions are not limited to supplying an application, synthesis 
or refinement of existing “practice theory”, for it aims to strike out in a rather new 
direction, and to build a coherent and original theory of practices from the ground 
up. The differences begin already with the first step of the argument, for this book 
starts from a somewhat idiosyncratic conception of what practices are in the first 
place. From this point of entry, it constructs an interlocking series of arguments 
about the basic nature of practices and about the implications of this nature for 
their effective empirical investigation. Thus, this book hopes to lay certain philo-
sophical, theoretical and methodological foundations for substantive empirical 
research on the practices of human social life.
The arguments of this book are intended to have a very wide-ranging scope. 
They suggest that, done well and done carefully, the systematic analysis of histor-
ical practices has much to contribute to virtually all substantive realms and topics 
in the social sciences and humanities. At its best, such analysis will prompt new 
questions, provide new perspectives, suggest new connections, encourage new 
conceptualisations of phenomena, stimulate new avenues of research and draw 
attention to new and previously unnoticed phenomena in social-scientific inquiry. 
One of the aims of this book is to show, through argument and example, how such 
broad and diverse consequences might be expected to follow.
1 A “cultural” approach to social science
In its emphasis on practices, this book attempts to promote the possibility, power 
and significance of a broadly “cultural” approach to the social sciences. I do not 
mean to hang much on the word itself. “Culture” is a vague, multifarious and 
contested term, and is not one that features prominently in my own work. (Like 
some anthropologists, I would rather stick to the adjective and typically avoid the 
nominal form.)2 Here I use it instead as a loose, generic and convenient way to 
refer to a diverse family of approaches to the study of the social world. Speaking 
very generally, these heterogeneous approaches tend to be variously sensitive, 
inter alia, to the symbolic, ideological, representational, discursive, practical, 
ritualistic, identitarian, reflexive, normative, affective, aesthetic, unconscious, 
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quotidian, conventional, artefactual, relational, interactional, contextual and 
constitutive dimensions of social life. (Elsewhere in the book I occasionally make 
generic reference to “cultural phenomena”; it is elements such as these that are 
broadly intended.) These approaches are centrally interested, that is, in patterns in 
the action and in the materially manifest forms of thought of people in particular 
times and places.3
Without denying the significance of other emphases, this book suggests that 
the relationship between human practices and human knowledge ought to be the 
analytical centrepiece of “cultural” approaches to the social sciences. Again with-
out dismissing alternatives, it also argues that “cultural” approaches, understood 
in this sense, are not just one option among others in the social sciences; they are 
analytically essential to the study of social phenomena in general. It advances a 
series of arguments in support of this position, along with a detailed investigation 
of the broad nature and implications of the practice–knowledge relationship.
Many, though not all, “cultural” approaches to social research position them-
selves outside of the traditional epistemological conventions of the social sciences.4 
It is customary within the social sciences to group these conventions under the 
label of “positivism”. This label is extremely vague and problematic, and on any 
careful construal almost certainly false; for familiarity and brevity, on the other 
hand, it has no going rival. I accept it therefore for the purposes of briefly char-
acterising this book’s epistemological stance, which is resolutely non-positivist, 
indeed probably anti-positivist, in the aforementioned sense of that term. That is 
to say that it straightforwardly rejects, among other things, the presumed necessity 
and/or superiority of the hypothetico-deductive model of theory construction and 
evaluation in the social sciences; the methodological and epistemological unity 
of the natural and social sciences; the fundamental underlying unity of principles, 
of inferential standards and of the logic of inquiry in qualitative and quantita-
tive research; the search for “law-like”, uniform causal generalisations (whether 
deterministic or probabilistic in nature); and the understanding of social causality 
on the broad model – if not necessarily the specific terms – of statistical inference.
There are social scientists who might construe any position that eschews com-
mitments such as these as an intrinsic rejection of “the social-science enterprise”.5 
Such claims can only rest on an extremely narrow and arbitrary conception of 
social science. This book is in part an effort to demonstrate not just the possibility 
but the great power of a far broader conception of social-scientific inquiry. It is 
a conception which retains, indeed insists on, a strong commitment to analytical 
rigour.6 In this respect, this book aligns itself with a growing literature in the het-
erodox social sciences which places a heavy emphasis on conceptual, analytical 
and methodological issues (e.g. Martin 2011; Hall 1999; Topper 2005; Reed 2011; 
Packer 2010; Biernacki 2012; Toomela and Valsiner 2010). Rigour of thought 
and analysis is certainly no proprietary possession of “positivist” social science. 
Indeed, this book hopes to show that sustained rigorous reflection can demonstrate 
the profound implausibility – or, at the very least, the wholly optional status – 
of many of the underlying conceptual, ontological, epistemo logical and meth-
odological assumptions of conventional social-scientific research. An inflexible 
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commitment to a particular construal of rigour and a particular image of precision 
can lead to theorising that is often, in actual fact, neither rigorous nor precise in 
its characterisation and explanation of the varied phenomena of the social world. 
It is my aim to develop these reflections and arguments in a clear, systematic and 
compelling fashion that is accessible to both a mainstream and non-mainstream 
social-science audience. I also aim to demonstrate in an intuitively plausible fash-
ion what, concretely, is at stake in the issues explored in these pages, particularly 
for empirical research. I aim, in other words, to show readers exactly why they 
should care about these issues, whatever their persuasion.
I expect that this book may encounter a different sort of scepticism from certain 
readers of a more heterodox stripe. These readers may well wonder what the point 
is, and whether I am not laboriously reinventing the wheel (in an alien and forced 
analytical vocabulary and style, no less). Some may think this is time wasted 
resurrecting old, and unproductive, debates; others will believe these debates to 
have been long settled – in favour of the home team, no doubt. They might also 
believe that all of my substantive arguments and conclusions are already reflected 
in existing or current work in social theory and heterodox social science. All of 
the social-scientific disciplines have had their own pitched epistemological and 
methodological battles or underground resistance movements; I will not even try 
to canvas them here. I will leave ultimate judgements about novelty and relevance 
in the hands of the reader. All I can ask is that the sceptic read the arguments care-
fully and in full before deciding.
2 Practice theory today
This book will directly set out to develop an original account of the nature and 
significance of practices in the social world. It will not systematically compare 
this account with the existing literature in practice theory, nor will the existing 
literature be subject to detailed review and critical assessment.7 Nevertheless, it 
is worth making a few generic points about today’s practice theory at the outset 
in order to highlight some aspects of what is analytically at stake in these pages.
The distinctive character of the account of practices presented here can be 
traced to its very point of departure: to its conception of what practices are in the 
first place. In this regard an important point about the understanding of “prac-
tice” in the existing literature should be noted. One way of formulating this point 
might be to observe that practice theorists have typically been interested more in 
“practice”, in the abstract singular and without an article, than in “practices” – 
than in the specific kinds of things that people do and have done, the diverse 
concrete activities in which they engage.8 To date, practice scholars have tended 
to conceive of practice in terms of habitual or customary performance based on 
skills acquired through experience, training or routine performance, and embod-
ied in “tacit knowledge” or know-how.9 This conception thus draws in part on 
the familiar opposition between practice and theory – i.e. rational, reflective, 
“calculative” thought – drawn in everyday language. Thus practice theorists have 
stressed the habitual, tacit, non-calculative, non-representational, unspoken and 
Introduction 5
“everyday” dimensions of human action.10 They have presented practice as a 
matter of customary or competent activity based on skills acquired through expe-
rience, training and routine performance. For these scholars, practice is that broad 
domain of human action that is familiar to the point where it becomes “second 
nature” and quasi-automatic, performed without much in the way of deliberate 
reflection. It is the product of inarticulate skills, practical knowledge and know-
how (not “know-that”), of a “practical sense”, a “feel for the game”.
Thus in world politics, for instance, the performance of practices of inter-
national summitry may be held to rely on often unarticulated and unreflected 
background knowledge, such as the “very specific and skilful way for state offi-
cials to subtly take a little distance from the consensus forged for the official 
communiqué”. Generic practices of strategic bargaining à la Thomas Schelling 
(1960; 1966) likewise require background skills of effective communication 
and signalling – of threats, resolve/commitment, correct incentives, etc. – and of 
being able to walk the fine line between brinkmanship and disaster. Moreover, the 
communicative practices themselves, as well as their recognition and interpreta-
tion, operate almost entirely in the realm of the tacit, given that in the relevant 
situations, explicit “talk is cheap” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 7–8). The behav-
iour of diplomats – e.g. copying budgets, updating protocols, handling a senior 
promotion – is shaped by their juggling of at least three distinct, often contra-
dictory, unspoken “scripts”: those of the bureaucrat, the hero, and the mediator 
(Neumann 2005). Background tacit knowledge is required for those who witness 
as much as those who engage in practices. Thus Charles de Gaulle’s ostentatious 
1963 veto of British membership in the European Common Market reflected a 
tacit “tradition of great-power lèse-majesté which was quite recognisable even to 
avowed ‘pro-Europeans’, much as they may have deplored it” (Navari 2011: 10).
The concerns motivating this approach are important ones. The practice turn 
has usefully drawn attention to core aspects of human action largely ignored or 
undertheorised in conventional approaches to social science. These include the 
“unconscious” and “subconscious”, “instinctive”, habitual and “corporeal” dimen-
sions of action and knowledge. They also include the variety of capacities and skills 
which undergird different types of action. Practice theory has drawn attention to 
the qualitatively distinct nature, the significance and the ubiquity of know-how as 
a type of knowledge. Sometimes it has been accompanied by renewed attention 
to people’s agency, creativity and active resistance to entrenched, overt forms of 
order and power. It has contributed to growing attention (in various quarters) to 
the role of affect and emotion in social behaviour. It has also emphasised the oft-
neglected “everyday” aspects of social and political life.11
There are, however, a number of serious analytical difficulties that afflict 
explanatory accounts based on such a conception of practice(s). Some of these 
problems have been set out crisply and incisively by Nigel Pleasants, Theodore 
Schatzki and Stephen Turner, among others (Pleasants 1996; 1999: chs 4–5; 
Schatzki 1990; 1997; Turner 1994; 2002: 31–2, 45–7).12 (The relative neglect 
among practice scholars of Schatzki’s vigorous arguments against conceptions 
of practice that appeal to tacit knowledge and tacit rules is particularly striking. 
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As an editor of the seminal multidisciplinary volume of practice theory cited in 
the epigraph, and author of three of the only book-length practice accounts to 
date, his is one name known to all advocates of the practice turn in the social 
sciences and humanities.)
One key issue is the explanatory ambition of these accounts. It may be that 
identifying, conceptualising and characterising action and behaviour come across 
as fairly uninteresting, and largely atheoretical, exercises – preliminaries, per-
haps, to social-scientific investigation, and not ends in themselves. Even scholars 
who eschew mainstream epistemic practices may nonetheless share a widespread, 
if perhaps largely unconscious, assumption in the social sciences: that as social 
phenomena, action and behaviour are more or less uncomplicated and straight-
forward to identify, describe and classify – unlike, perhaps, motives, intentions, 
ideas, norms, culture, discourse, functions, structures, institutions and so on. (That 
such an assumption may cross epistemological lines might help explain why a 
social-scientific focus on “mere” behavioural regularities seems to strike so many 
“non-positivist” scholars as narrow and analytically regressive.)13 Challenging 
this assumption is one aim of this book. The book thus stresses the profound 
importance and interest, but also the profound complexity, of effectively charac-
terising human behaviour for social-scientific research. My personal sense is that 
there is little that is straightforward about identifying generic forms of human 
behaviour for the purposes of general explanation. This applies even to those 
forms of behaviour we are inclined to find extremely familiar.
Whatever the reasons, there is a clear pattern in the practice turn. To this point, 
specific empirical practices, and their particular features and interrelations, have 
not been the object of primary theoretical interest. When they do receive atten-
tion, it is typically derivative. They are examined because, and to the extent that, 
these activities are thought to exhibit features held to be typical of “practice” 
in general – for instance, a certain tacit, unreflective, intuitive, skilful, non- 
representational, commonsensical or habitual quality. These shared qualities, and 
not the specific details of the specific activities (in and of) themselves, are the 
main object of attention. Moreover, what is supposed to be theoretically inter-
esting about these practices is that they embody, or are symptoms of, certain 
other types of phenomena which are held to underlie and to structure, guide and 
produce them: dispositions, tacit knowledge, tacit (or constitutive) rules, norms, 
principles, codes, formulae, habits, habitus, conventions, standards of correctness, 
attitudes, scripts, schemes, cognitive schemata, and so forth.14
The result is somewhat ironic for an approach that purports to privilege 
practice. Practice scholars have often done little to systematically identify and 
theorise, with close precision, the actual activities of social life themselves. For 
much of this work “practices” has, in a sense, functioned as an odd placeholder 
term. Use of the concept is supposed to signal a certain interest in materiality – 
as against, typically, the alleged non-materiality of discourse and texts. Yet in 
practice, scholarship citing it tends to remark only incidentally or in an ad hoc 
fashion on the concrete things people actually do. The real theoretical attention 
is in fact devoted to those entities which are alleged to cause (or “constitute”) 
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and explain people’s actions. Sometimes the terms “practice” and “practices” are 
actually used to refer to these underlying phenomena,15 and not the activities they 
supposedly produce. Other scholars seem to slide arbitrarily between the one and 
the other when referring to “practices”.
I will not engage in a systematic critique of existing practice theory here. 
These problematic features aren’t at any rate unique to it; they are characteristic 
of the treatment of the “cultural” realm in the social sciences more generally. Two 
in particular may be noted. One concerns the way the explanatory relationship 
between action and the proposed underlying cultural phenomenon is conceived. 
This relationship is seen either as an instance of garden-variety causality, or, more 
intriguingly, as a “constitutive” relation. The former view is simplistic, unrealistic 
and exceedingly narrow. The latter is more promising, but typically left extremely 
vague and undertheorised by its advocates. On those rare occasions that it is given 
flesh, it very often turns out to be construed as a softer form of determination in 
social life than causality, a kind of “causality-lite”. Its broad epistemic aims and 
form are similar to those of traditional causal explanation of human behaviour: to 
account for the occurrence of specific actions on specific occasions. In this book, I 
argue that this is the wrong thing to ask of “cultural” theories of the social world. 
In Chapter 7, I endorse the appeal to constitutive relations, but argue that these 
should be conceptualised in a rather distinctive fashion. 
The other aspect common to these approaches to practice – and to “cultural” 
accounts more broadly – is the nature of the “explanans”, the cultural phenomena 
alleged to do the explaining. Examples include (tacit) rules, norms, principles, dis-
positions, tacit knowledge, habits, habitus, conventions, scripts, hexis, standards, 
codes, (unspoken) formulae, attitudes, schemes, schemata and tendencies. Each 
of these has a venerable pedigree in the social sciences. And despite non-trivial 
differences among them, they form something of a family. They all represent hid-
den entities that are supposed to exist in addition to, to underlie, and to infuse and 
generate the manifest actions they are cited to explain. 
Though some of them have certain limited uses, I consider them generally to 
be rather suspect and occult analytical objects. In most cases one can reasonably 
doubt whether any coherent entities corresponding to these categories actually 
exist. One can also question the explanatory logic and power of such entities, and 
indeed argue that there is little to nothing that positing such entities adds to a care-
ful description of the activities themselves. Just as corrosively, a powerful case 
can be made that not only are allegedly ubiquitous objects like tacit social rules, 
norms and behavioural dispositions not needed to make sense of human behav-
iour, but that they could not fulfil this role even if they were. What’s more, one 
might plausibly argue that the analytical dependence actually runs in the opposite 
direction from the one imagined: that the identification and characterisation of 
“norms”, “dispositions” and “tacit rules” that allegedly explain practices, and the 
impression of their explanatory power, fundamentally rely on the theorist’s prior 
grasp of features of the practices themselves – and, at their most effective, often 
simply restate or redescribe those features. In the place of pseudo-explainers like 
these, I will recommend sustained attention to that very behaviour, to the actual 
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practices themselves, as well as to their constitutive relationship with knowledge 
in its material and discursive forms. A close examination of concrete practices 
and knowledge will help produce not only more accurate and useful description, 
conceptualisation and characterisation but also more successful (constitutive and 
even causal) explanation.
3 Core ontological commitments
Together, the arguments advanced in this book urge a particular image of social-
scientific inquiry, based upon what it takes to be core features of the ontology of 
the social world. A few very general and abstract aspects of this image can be 
specified at the outset. One is the ineliminably historical nature of the social world 
and of the phenomena therein. Practices are fundamentally historical phenomena, 
which come into being, exist and disappear in a particular time and place. Our 
epistemic practices – particularly our practices of conceptualising, characterising 
and generalising about social phenomena – should therefore be oriented to, and 
genuinely reflect, this historicity. Second, and relatedly, practices are contingent 
phenomena. There are few human practices of any moderate complexity that are 
universal in any meaningful sense, and what might at first appear to be subtle 
or minor differences between practices can be of considerable significance for 
social-scientific inquiry. Most human practices did not, strictly speaking, have 
to arise at all or take the form they did; most have required specific conditions 
for their existence, and have depended profoundly on elements of their historical 
context for their very nature and persistence.
A third point follows from this: that human practices, and therefore virtually 
all social phenomena, are deeply contextual things. They are in important part 
constituted by specific elements of their context, and cannot be fully identified and 
understood in analytic isolation from that context. This leads to a fourth point: if 
contexts are fundamental to the very identity and existence of practices (and other 
social phenomena), then we need to identify them with far greater specificity than 
they have hitherto been. We should proliferate the number of social phenom-
ena we recognise, and seek to identify and distinguish them in their cultural and 
historical specificity. This has direct implications for social-scientific concept-
formation. In particular, the kinds of abstract, typologically oriented, functional 
concepts typical of conventional social science will normally be profoundly inad-
equate to the (contextually varied) phenomena they seek to capture and describe. 
Thence, too, a fifth point: the relationship between a practice and the key elements 
of its context is constitutive in nature. This constitutive relationship helps us to 
understand not only the existence but the specific features and indeed the very 
generality of a practice. Many of the central sorts of explanatory generalisations to 
be made about practices will therefore be generalisations about constitutive rela-
tions and can best, perhaps only, be captured by constitutive theorising.
Yet this is not to deny the role, presence or indeed ubiquity of causality in 
the social world. Many heterodox approaches to the social sciences have tended 
to reject outright the relevance or even the possibility of causal inquiry into the 
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social world. Others have accepted something of an intellectual division of labour, 
effectively leaving causal inquiry to the “positivists”. Though I understand the 
impulse behind the first response, and indeed once felt it myself, I believe both to 
be mistaken. What is fundamentally problematic, I believe, is not the existence, 
extent or importance of social causality, but the particular monolithic conception 
of causality presumed by mainstream social-scientific inquiry. Countless variants 
of this conception have been offered, but its core is remarkably stable, and it is so 
widespread and so deeply entrenched, in our daily lives as much as in academic 
research, that it has effectively become synonymous with causality tout court. It 
is something along the lines of the motivating image behind statistical inference: 
what might be called “correlation-plus” – uniformly regular covariance of the 
occurrence of instances (or of the “values” of some attribute) of the explanans 
and explanandum, plus some mysterious “extra” element, its identity endlessly 
debated, that secures actual causal influence from the one to the other. The covari-
ance may be deterministic or stochastic in nature, but either way, it is uniform in 
its regularity.
In my view, this conception is fundamentally inappropriate as a characterisa-
tion of virtually any actually existing form of social causality. It is fine, indeed 
quite useful, to speak of causes and causings in the social world, so long as we 
drop the assumption of uniform regularity and attend to the possibility of plural 
and perhaps extremely diverse forms of social causality. In Chapter 6 we will 
see one proposal for a generic way of characterising this irregularity and this 
potential diversity. In Chapters 6 and 7, I present arguments that attempt to rec-
oncile the simultaneous possibility in the social world of vast causal diversity and 
contingency, on the one hand, and the manifest regularity and generality of social 
phenomena, on the other. Again, these arguments underscore the significance and 
autonomy of constitutive theory.
A final word on pigeonholes, “-isms” and tribal allegiances. I am somewhat 
wary of labels. No doubt they are necessary to some extent. On the other hand, 
they too often function as shortcuts and indeed substitutes for critical thought. 
They can allow scholars, particularly when confronted with the unfamiliar, to 
peg and to typecast, and to trot out glib stock criticisms, without feeling any need 
for careful engagement with arguments. Despite the diverse range of theoretical 
approaches and philosophical positions on offer in the social sciences today, I’m 
not sure that this work fits very easily into any of them. One can’t realistically 
expect, however, to escape assignment to more familiar categories. A little pre-
emptive self-identification, then, for whatever it’s worth. 
Philosophically, this book is strongly influenced by the work of the so-called 
Stanford School in the history/philosophy of science. For a period during the 
1980s, the Stanford philosophy department was home to a formidable group 
of broadly like-minded thinkers: Ian Hacking, Nancy Cartwright, John Dupré, 
Peter Galison, Margaret Morrison and Arnold Davidson. The subject matter of 
this book reflects one of their primary philosophical preoccupations: “One thing 
that unites Stanford School practitioners is a strong respect for scientific practice – 
actual scientific practice” (Hoefer 2008: 1; original emphasis). The names and 
